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I. INTRODUCTION
Some have called it “The Best Answer to Every Legal Question,”1 while
others roll their eyes and call it the “typical lawyer answer.” After all, can
the public really blame lawyers for this ambiguous answer when we are
taught to analyze legal problems under the guise of “Getting to Maybe”?2
Of course, this inquiry is rhetorical, but it is indisputable that the phrase
“it depends” has certainly left a particular taste of disdain in the public’s
mouth.
Undeniably, many legal problems are heavily fact-specific and require
a particular amount of individualized assessment and cannot be answered
with a simple “yes” or “no.” Certainly, “it depends” seems, at the very least,
a fair answer when the extrapolated effects of a specific proposal have yet
to be ascertained. Like most legal inquiries, “it depends” is a perfectly
calculated response to a corporation that might inquire whether introducing
sustainability performance measures to its executive compensation plan is
a good idea.
As corporations continue to innovate and adapt with the changing
economic times, and the corresponding regulatory environment, many
have introduced new policies and measures in executive compensation.3
In addition to pay-for-performance becoming the industry norm,4 some
corporations are going further by introducing sustainability-based
performance measures. It is no secret that sustainability practices are
affecting corporations throughout the United States, as evidenced by the
onslaught of sustainability committees and other corporate-wide sustainability
practices;5 however, the introduction of meaningful sustainability initiatives
and the use of sustainability performance measures as a means by which
to compensate executives are two entirely separate ideas.

1. Stephen Futeral, The BEST Answer to EVERY Legal Question, CHARLESTON
LAWYERS BLOG (Nov. 10, 2013), http://www.charlestonlaw.net/best-answer-every-legalquestion-charleston-lawyers/.
2. RICHARD FISCHEL & JEREMY PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE: HOW TO EXCEL ON LAW
SCHOOL EXAMS (1999).
3. Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation
Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 228 n.3
(1999–2000) (acknowledging that some have linked the pay-for-performance philosophy
to the Protestant Reformation and some have gone even further as to tie the principle to
Julius Caesar before the birth of Christ.).
4. See generally Pay for Performance, GLASSLEWIS.COM, http://www.glasslewis.com/
issuer/pay-for-performance/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Pay for Performance,
GLASSLEWIS].
5. See Jayne W. Barnard, At the Intersection of Corporate Governance and
Environmental Sustainability, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 207, 213 (2011).
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Although sustainability performance appears to be a logical extension
of the traditional performance-based compensation model, the effect and
result of such performance remains unclear and untested across the
market.6 The adoption of broad-based sustainability performance measures
may be dangerous because, often times, these measures are tailored to the
corporation and may decrease total shareholder return in the short run.7
Regardless of whether or not the corporation decides to introduce these
measures, their effect on total shareholder return8 and other corporate
interests requires an individualized analysis.
Part II of this Comment discusses the current state of executive
compensation, including the use of peer group benchmarking in establishing
executive pay and the use of performance-based compensation. This
overview will describe the characteristics of a peer group and considerations
that compensation consultants evaluate before they select peer groups.
Part II also discusses how performance-based compensation became
prominent, the basic reasoning for performance-based compensation, and
other tax related reasons for adopting performance-based compensation
under Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Part III, the primary purpose of this Comment, examines sustainability
in corporate America. Specifically, this section defines “sustainability”
and “sustainability performance measures,” and discusses how corporations
currently embrace sustainability through an industry sample featuring
three uniquely situated corporations. Finally, Part III concludes by examining
the primary concern with embracing sustainability performance measures:
accurate measurement.
Part IV engages in a broad-based examination of corporate social
responsibility concerns that must be vetted before introducing corporate
sustainability measures. This section examines the Shareholder Primacy
6. A small minority of corporations go as far as to include sustainability
performance measures in performance-based compensation plans. See Michael Meehan,
Tying Executive Pay To Sustainability Performance, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.
forbes.com/2010/10/25/executive-compensation-linkage-technology-sustainability-goals.
html.
7. These measures may also be dangerous to introduce to proxy materials due to
an influx of recent lawsuits arising for “incomplete” or “misleading” disclosures of pay
practices. See The Hay Group, Executive Compensation 2013: Data Trends and Strategies 15
(2014).
8. Id. at 4 (“The say-on-pay provision of the Dodd-Frank Act has heightened
concerns about the alignment of pay-for-performance with total shareholder return,
making this a top consideration in 2013.”).
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View,9 as advocated by prominent free-market economist Milton
Friedman, and the Triple Bottom Line10 approach. This section concludes by
reviewing the emerging theory of the Sustainability Model of Corporate
Social Responsibility.11 Part V offers concluding reflections on the
individualized considerations that must be discussed before introducing
sustainability performance measures into a corporation’s executive
compensation plan.
II. CURRENT PRACTICES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
In accordance with federal law,12 the New York Stock Exchange listing
standards and the NASDAQ listing standards,13 publicly-held corporations
must establish a compensation committee comprised of “independent”
members of its board of directors. The compensation committee is
responsible for establishing and governing the compensation and benefit
policies of the corporation. Specifically, a compensation committee “assists
the [b]oard of [d]irectors in its responsibilities with respect to the
compensation of the [c]orporation’s executive officers and other key
employees, and administers all employee benefit plans . . . .” 14 The
compensation committee, typically through a compensation consultant,
considers numerous criteria including: the executive officer’s annual base
salary, target annual incentive bonus, target long-term incentive
compensation, performance-based compensation goals and target total
direct compensation for executives among peer group companies,15 as
well as tenure, future potential, cost of living, and the corporation’s
performance against various pre-established internal operational and
qualitative goals.16

9. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
12. SEC Listing Standards Relating to Compensation Committees, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10C-1 (2014); 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2014); 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3 (2014).
13. Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Compensation
Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 34-68639, 78 Fed. Reg. 4570 (Jan. 11, 2013);
Order Approving NASDAQ’s Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Compensation Committees,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-68640, 78 Fed. Reg. 4554 (Jan. 11, 2013).
14. SJW, Corp., 2013 Proxy Statement, at 10 (Mar. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/766829/000076682913000010/sjw2013proxy.htm#s
41B92A74A5D428673F9D50F7830C5CD7.
15. Starbucks Corp., 2013 Proxy Statement, at 31 (Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/829224/000119312513024028/d455402ddef14a.htm.
16. SJW, Corp., infra note 14, at 44.
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Many industry leaders 17 and corporations 18 believe that executive
compensation plans and policies need to be closely tied to the corporation
and its shareholders. Compensation consultants and many corporate
officers posit that if the primary duty of the corporation is to increase its
profits,19 then aligning executive compensation practices with the
performance of the corporation’s stock, in relation to its peers, will most
closely align the executives’ interests with that of the shareholders.20
A. Peer Grouping
Typically, “peer grouping” is initiated by the compensation committee’s
retention of a compensation consultant who “advise[s] on the design and
balance of the whole executive reward plan.” 21 The compensation
consultant then attempts to put the proposed compensation plan into
market perspective by “construct[ing] a framework of comparative metrics
based on the level and structure of pay at companies deemed similar.”22
According to corporate governance provider, Institutional Shareholder
Services (“ISS”), peer groups generally contain between fourteen (14) to
twenty-four (24) corporations that are “reasonably similar to the subject
company in terms of industry profile, size, and market capitalization.”23
These peer groups also consider criteria such as global reach, geographic

17. Pay for Performance, GLASSLEWIS, supra note 4.
18. Guess?, Inc., 2013 Proxy Statement, at 30 (May 29, 2013), available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912463/000091246313000014/0000912463-13-000014index.htm.
19. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine -The Social Responsibility of Business
Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32–33.
20. To see how performance and executive pay correlated for a small sample of
corporations during the last fiscal year, see Theo Francis & Joann Lublin, CEO Pay Rising but
Not for All, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 26, 2014, 7:50 PM), http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304026304579448961007000986?mg=reno6
4wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702304026
304579448961007000986.html.
21. Executive Compensation, THE H AY GROUP, http://www.haygroup.com/us/
services/index.aspx?id=1690 (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
22. Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer Groups and
Overcompensation: Cause, Effect and Solution, 38 J. CORP. L. 487, 494 (2012).
23. 2015 U.S. Compensation Policies: Frequently Asked Questions ,
ISSGOVERANCE.COM (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/2015
comprehensivecompensationfaqs.pdf; SJW, Corp., infra note 14, at 45 (noting that peer
companies were selected “on the basis of objective industry classifications, geographic
location and financial size criteria.”).
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location, brand recognition, performance, and companies with which the
corporation may compete for executive talent or customers.24 Although
critics suggest that peer groups are one leading cause of executive
overcompensation,25 the industry continues to whole-heartedly embrace
the comparative process.26 In general, corporations use their peer group’s
compensation plans as a benchmark off which they evaluate their own
proposed compensation plan.27 After the compensation consultant and
committee complete the peer group market analysis, they revise the
proposed compensation plan in an attempt to create a plan in or around
the fiftieth percentile of the peer group as to avoid being an outlier and
being subject to heightened Say-on-Pay scrutiny.28
B. Performance-Based Compensation29
In addition to the applicable state and federal law, publicly-held
corporations must also adhere to 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (“Section 162(m)”),30
which is commonly referred to as the “million-dollar-cap rule.”31 Section
162(m) limits the amount that a public corporation can deduct as
compensation paid to any “covered employee” to one million dollars, per
24. Starbucks Corp., supra note 15, at 31.
25. Elson and Ferrere, supra note 22, at 497–500 (discussing the problem with peer
group analysis).
26. For a general discussion of pay-for-performance methodology and peer
benchmarking, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation,
by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1659 (2005)(book review);
James McConvill, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: Rising Above the
“Pay-for-Performance” Principle, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 413, 417 (2006).
27. See Elson and Ferrere, supra note 22, at 494 (“The boards of most U.S. public
companies set executive compensation through a mechanistic process referred to as peer
grouping.”)(internal quotations omitted).
28. In 2010, Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act codified the advisory “Say-on-Pay” vote of the Named Executive Officers
by shareholders. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–
5641).
29. As used in this Comment, the term “performance-based compensation” refers
to compensation based on objective performance measures, such as profits, return on equity,
earnings per share and other more individual and specific criterion. Other commentators may
also use the term “contingent compensation” interchangeably.
30. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(2014).
31. Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions-Executive Compensation in the Era of
Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 287 (1999) (“Under § 162(m) of the
Internal Revenue Code . . . compensation to an executive of more than one million dollars per
year is not deductible by the corporation unless it is performance-based.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
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person, per year.32 However, Section 162(m) provides several exceptions
to the million-dollar-cap rule. Pertinently, Section 162(m) excludes
performance-based compensation33 from its definition of “applicable
employee remuneration.”34 Therefore, publicly-held companies incorporate
performance-based compensation into their compensation plans, not only
because it purportedly motivates executives to create shareholder value,35 but
also for alternative tax purposes.
In the 1990s, performance-based compensation rose in popularity when
protests broke out over rising levels of executive compensation.36 In light
of these protests,37 performance-based compensation became the primary
method by which corporations based their compensation plans because it
was seen as an objective benchmark to measure executive performance.38
Today, similar to the 1990s, “performance continues to be the name of the
game,”39 with leading compensation consultants observing that “executive
incentives are shifting to reward performance in both short- and long-term
incentives.” 40 In justification of performance-based compensation,
experts argue that such performance methodology “[provides an] incentive
for executives to perform in ways that maximize corporate/shareholder
32. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(1)(2014) (“[N]o deduction shall be allowed under this
chapter for applicable employee remuneration with respect to any covered employee to
the extent that the amount of such remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such
employee exceeds $1,000,000.”).
33. For a further discussion of the performance-based compensation exemption, see
P. GARTH GARTRELL & STEVEN LAPIDUS, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION FOR EMERGING
GROWTH CORPORATIONS § 2:80 (3d ed. 2013).
34. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(2014).
35. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 14 n.78 (2000) (noting that some scholars have suggested that
Section 162(m) indicates that Congress “believes that performance-based plans motivate
executives to create shareholder value.”).
36. See Graef S. Crystal, CEOs and Incentives: The Myth of “Pay for Performance”,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-01-08/business/fi-17839_1_payplan.
37. Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach
to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 61 (1992) (arguing that executives are
overcompensated).
38. See Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The
Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1992, at 28, 31
(referencing a report that noted that more than 80% of the largest U.S. corporations tie
long-term performance of the corporation to executive compensation).
39. The Hay Group, Executive Compensation 2013: Data Trends and Strategies,
supra note 7, at 4.
40. Id. at 16.
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wealth” and “[pays] executives commensurately with their contribution to
a corporation’s growth and performance.”41 Although academic studies
disagree on whether performance-based compensation plans are effective,42
compensation experts generally agree that “[p]ay for performance makes
the most sense when the link between compensation and performance is
clear.”43 With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010,44 the Say-on-Pay process “heightened
the emphasis on ensuring that [executive] pay appropriately reflects
performance,”45 thus pressuring corporations to set forth readily measureable
performance-based goals. Despite the difficulty in setting performance
goals,46 it is critical in effectively crafting a performance-based compensation
plan that is compliant with Section 162(m) and satisfies the shareholders
through the Say-on-Pay process.
Performance-based compensation is typically comprised of both shortterm and long-term incentive compensation. Although each compensation
plan is unique, the typical composition includes an annual base salary
with short-term performance incentives, including annual bonuses,
discretionary performance awards, and long-term performance incentives,
typically comprised of performance-based restricted stock units and
performance shares. Leading compensation consultants also note that
compensation plans once dominated by stock options47 have now shifted
towards a combination of restricted stock, restricted stock units, and
performance-based restricted stock, depending on the industry.48 Other
post-employment benefits may also be included as part of an executive
compensation plan including retirement benefits, deferred compensation,
and severance benefits. In addition, most compensation plans also include
executive perquisites, namely, the use of the corporate aircraft, financial

41.
42.
43.
44.

See Stabile, supra note 3, at 229–30.
Id. at 239–41.
Loewenstein, supra note 35, at 13.
For a summary of the Dodd-Frank Act, see P. GARTH GARTRELL & STEVEN
LAPIDUS, supra note 33, at § 3:82.
45. The Hay Group, Executive Compensation 2013: Data Trends and Strategies,
supra note 7, at 13.
46. Katherine Connor, CEO pay shifts to long-term, performance-based equity, THE
DAILY TRANSCRIPT, Mar. 20, 2014, available at http://www.sddt.com/News/article.cfm?
SourceCode=20140320czf&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NightlyNews&utm_camp
aign=2014-0320&_t=CEO+pay+shifts+to+longterm+performancebased+equity#.UyuS5O29LCQ
(“Setting the goals was probably the most challenging part . . . helping to frame and set
those long-term goals for performance shares.”).
47. A stock option is a right to purchase company stock at a defined exercise price
over a specified option term. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1554 (9th ed. 2009).
48. Connor, supra note 46.
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planning services, company cars, security, supplemental life insurance,
and physical exams.49
All told, corporations, their compensation committees, and compensation
consultants generally design compensation plans to recruit and retain top
executive talent, to reward the achievement of financial and operational
goals, and to align the executives’ interests with that of the corporation’s
long-term strategy, the shareholders’ interests, and the interests of the
corporation’s customer base.50 Despite some recent examples of excessive
compensation,51 empirical research has generally indicated that the structure
of the compensation plan directly correlates to the positive financial return
of the corporation.52
III. SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Before current sustainability performance measures can be reviewed
and evaluated, we must attempt to define sustainability and sustainability
performance measures. Despite how casually the term “sustainability” is
used, it is fairly ambiguous and deserves a closer look.
A. What is Sustainability?
The term “sustainability” is consistently used by environmentalists,
politicians, and the news media, but there is little consensus regarding a

49. The Hay Group, Executive Compensation 2013: Data Trends and Strategies,
supra note 7, at 10.
50. Many leading scholars have criticized performance-based compensation as an
effective method of compensating executives. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED,
supra note 26; John E. Core et. al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without
Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1142 (2005) (summarizing Bebchuk and Fried’s
thesis “that executive compensation practices in the U.S. benefit corporate executives at
the expense of shareholders through implicit and explicit corruption of the pay-setting
process.”).
51. Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock-Salary and Options Too: The Looting of
Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 419-20 nn.1–10 (2010) (discussing various excessive
and egregious executive compensation plans).
52. See Robert T. Masson, Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent
Equity Performance, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1278, 1278–79 (1971) (stating that “firms with
executives whose financial interests are more closely parallel to the goals of the stockholders
and the long-run profitability of the firm do indeed outperform other firms in stock
return.”); John R. Deckop, Determinants of Chief Executive Compensation, 41 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 215, 224–25 (1988) (noting “that among firms of equal size, CEO
compensation tends to increase directly with profits.”).
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functional definition.53 Some commentators have suggested that sustainability
means “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs.” 54 Consequently, some
commentators posit that sustainable businesses attempt to “tread[] as lightly
as possible on the earth and its natural resources.”55
While each of these definitions are helpful as a starting place, for
purposes of this Comment, “[e]nvironmental sustainability involves
protecting the environment, preventing further harms to nature, cleaning
up pollution and other harmful emissions, conserving and recycling,
maintaining the ecosystem, improving the environment, and/or restoring
the ecosystem to a former, a pristine or pre-human condition.”56 This
thorough framework will provide a useful starting point to evaluate and
discuss the sustainability performance measures currently used by
publicly-held corporations.
B. What is a Sustainability Performance Measure?
Most often, sustainability performance measures are closely tied or
synonymous to sustainability principles and policies referred to elsewhere as
Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (“ESG”) measures.57
While ESG measures may sometimes include categories outside of the

53. See Sustainability in Executive Compensation, EXECCOMP.ORG, http://www.exec
comp.org/Issues/Issue/corporate-governance/sustainability-in-executive-compensation (last
visited Nov. 30, 2013) (“A discussion of sustainability with regard to executive compensation
typically refers to the growing interest by stakeholders of linking executive pay to
sustainability measures, often referred to as environmental, social and governance (ESG)
metrics, although definitions vary considerably among activists and investors.”); see also
Barnard, supra note 5, at 214 (“[W]hen asked ‘how does your company define sustainability?’
32.4 percent of [companies] answered ‘we avoid definitions and focus on actions.’”).
54. Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 990 (2009).
55. Id. at 990–91.
56. Barnard, supra note 5, at 209–10 n.4; Matteo Tonello, Sustainability in the
Boardroom, A 2013 Update, THE C ONFERENCE B OARD 1, 1 (2013), https://www.
conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-DN-V5N6-13.pdf&type=subsite
(defining sustainability as “an all-inclusive descriptor of any business initiative that the
corporation pursues based on considerations involving the interest of any stakeholder that
appears critical to the success of the business.”).
57. See Key Characteristics of Prominent Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals on
Environmental and Social Topics, 2005–2011, IRRC INSTITUTE 1, 4 (referring to ESG
measures as “E+S topics”).
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environmental scope,58 a significant portion of quantifiable research
specifically relates to these measures.59
For example, CERES, the leading non-profit organization advocating
for sustainable leadership, with the help of Sustainalytics,60 published a
2012 report 61 examining and evaluating numerous ESG measures.
Pertinently, the report evaluated six hundred (600) of the largest U.S.
corporations “on their progress towards meeting the expectations laid
forth in the CERES Roadmap for Sustainability.”62 According to CERES,
the data indicated that the use of ESG performance measures in executive
compensation plans is an emerging trend, but “still an anomaly.”63 Only
seven percent (7%) of the six hundred (600) corporations “formally tied
ESG performance to executive compensation”64 and nine percent (9%) of
those corporations did so without publishing specific targets.65 The 2010
CERES Roadmap for Sustainability66 set forth twenty (20) expectations
broken into four specific categories: (1) governance; (2) stakeholder
engagement; (3) disclosure; and (4) performance. 67 Although these
categories have varying degrees of integration, the performance category will
be the main focus for the purpose of this analysis because it is the typical
measure used when evaluating executive compensation plans.68 Thus, this
Comment will discuss sustainability performance measures, most commonly,

58. ESG measures sometimes encompass measures other than environmental
sustainability including employee morale, animal testing and diversity initiatives.
59. See G3: Executive Compensation tied to ESG Performance, CERES, http://
www.ceres.org/roadmap-assessment/company-performance/governance-for-sustainability/copy
_of_executive-compensation-tied-to-esg-performance (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) [hereinafter
G3, CERES].
60. For more information about this sustainability research firm, see About Us,
SUSTAINALYTICS.COM, http://www.sustainalytics.com/about-us (last visited Dec. 1, 2013).
61. CERES, The ROAD TO 2020: CORPORATE PROGRESS ON THE CERES ROADMAP
FOR SUSTAINABILITY, available at http://www.ceres.org/roadto2020 [hereinafter CERES,
ROADMAP FOR SUSTAINABILITY].
62. See G3, CERES, supra note 59.
63. CERES, ROADMAP FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 61, at 16.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. CERES, The 21st Century Corporation: The Ceres Roadmap for Sustainability,
available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/ceres-roadmap-to-sustainability-2010/view
[hereinafter CERES, The 21st Century Corporation].
67. CERES, ROADMAP FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 61, at 5 (discussing the 2010
Roadmap expectations).
68. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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the reduction in the overall carbon footprint of the corporation and broader
environmental goals in the areas of energy, water and recycling.
C. An Overview of Current Corporate Sustainability Measures
As highlighted by CERES, approximately fifty percent (50%) of the six
hundred (600) corporations participating in the research were making
progress in decreasing one main ESG measure—overall greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions.69 Typically, corporations achieved this through a
reduction in energy demands, acquiring alternative energy sources, and
focusing on energy efficiency,70 but only one-third of the sample
corporations had set a time-bound target for reducing such emissions.71
In addition to the goals and results relating to GHG emissions, CERES
found that only twenty-five percent (25%) of corporations had undertaken
assessments relating to water management and, similarly, only twentyfive percent (25%) of corporations currently maintained any degree of
supply chain monitoring.72 The lackluster data reported by CERES begs
the following question: why is there such reluctance by U.S. corporations to
embrace ESG performance criteria? If corporations are so reluctant to
embrace ESG measures in any capacity, then perhaps it should not be a
large surprise that so few corporations and compensation committees
embrace ESG performance in their executive compensation practices and
policies.73 While these statistics are certainly not dispositive, it certainly
indicates, at a minimum, a reluctance to embrace ESG performance
measures in any large scale.
D. Industry Sample
How do corporations use sustainability performance measures in their
executive compensation plans, and what are their standard measurements?
The answer to each of these questions can be found in the 2013 compensation
discussion and analysis (“CD&A”)74 sections of three publicly-held
corporation’s proxy disclosures: (1) Intel Corporation; (2) XCEL Energy; and
(3) Alcoa, Inc. These unique corporations span three different industries
including: (a) technology, (b) energy and (c) aluminum production, and

69. CERES, ROADMAP FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 61, at 6.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Tonello, supra note 56, at 11 (noting that more than 60% of respondent companies
“do not embed sustainability-related metrics into their top-executive compensation policy.”).
74. For a further description of the CD&A section in an annual proxy disclosure,
see P. GARTH GARTRELL & STEVEN LAPIDUS, supra note 33, at § 3:42.
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each take a different approach to sustainability performance as incorporated
by their executive compensation plans.
1. Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation (“Intel”) has long been considered one of the leading
corporations in terms of corporate sustainability. Intel has gone further
than any other corporation, tying the compensation of all employees, not
simply executives, to sustainability metrics.75
As disclosed in its annual proxy statement, “Intel’s pay-for-performance
programs include performance-based cash compensation that varies
depending on financial and operational performance . . . .”76 The operational
component of Intel’s compensation plan is tied to the “company[‘s]
performance in several key areas, including financial performance, product
design and development roadmaps, manufacturing, cost, and productivity
improvement, customer satisfaction, and corporate responsibility and
environmental sustainability.”77 Most notably, Intel’s compensation
committee selects operational goals that are also used in the “broad-based
employee annual incentive cash plan and are prepared each year as part
of the annual planning process for the company, so that all employees
are focused on achieving the same company-wide operational results.”78
Interestingly enough, Intel also recognizes that some of its operational
goals have “non-quantitative measures that require some degree of
subjective evaluation.”79
Although Intel does not disclose more specific information in its
CD&A, the company does confirm that operational goals have scored, on
average, 98.9% over the past five years.80 Intel has achieved incredible
results through the use of the above-stated performance-based operational
component in that it “has reduced [its] energy use by [eight] percent and
its GHG emissions by [twenty-three] percent”81 since the introduction of
the component. While Intel’s results are certainly impressive, the open
publication of specific ESG performance goals would: (i) encourage other
75. G3, CERES, supra note 59.
76. Intel Corp., 2013 Proxy Statement, at 37 (Apr. 3, 2013), available at http://
www.intc.com/intelProxy2013/static/pdfs/Intel_2013_Proxy_Statement.pdf.
77. Id. at 54.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 55.
80. Id.
81. G3, CERES, supra note 59.
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corporations to publicly disclose similar data, (ii) reflect an industry trend
towards corporate sustainability, and (iii) provide further empirical data to
support the economic feasibility of such ESG performance goals.
2. XCEL Energy
On a year-over-year basis, XCEL Energy (“XCEL”) achieved incredible
results relating to its pre-established sustainability performance goals. In
its 2013 proxy statement, XCEL stated that it met its financial and
operational sustainable performance goals for fiscal year 2012, thereby
increasing its annual dividends to shareholders for the ninth consecutive
year by 3.8%.82
Relating to environmental leadership, XCEL claims to have maximized its
“demand side management programs,” allowing customers to save energy
at a rate of 18.4% over 2011 for which the corporation earned $81.7
million in incentives. Furthermore, the corporation earned the following
achievements: a spot on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index for a sixth
time, a position on the Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index for the fifth
consecutive year, named number two in sustainable operations among public
U.S. utility companies by Target Rock Advisors, LLC, and earned the
Energy Star Sustained Excellence Award for the third time.83 In addition
to its sustainability accolades, XCEL also surpassed other ESG performance
goals in employee and executive diversity.84
XCEL’s compensation philosophy is heavily weighted for performancebased compensation under the theory that executives will be motivated to
achieve in the area of financial, operational, and stock price performance.85
Under its theory, XCEL awards executives “performance units,” which
make up almost two-thirds of its entire compensation plan over a three (3)
year performance period. Approximately one third of the performance units
“have a performance goal based on achieving environmental commitments,
while maintaining a competitive price for service provided to [its] customers
as measured relative to [its] peers.” 86 As evidenced by its 2013 proxy
statement, XCEL has not waivered in its short-term or long-term commitment
to environmental leadership all whilst achieving annual increases in
revenue and shareholder dividends.87

82. Xcel Energy Inc., 2013 Proxy Statement, at 37 (Apr. 8, 2013), available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72903/000119312513145419/d448819ddef14a.htm.
83. Id. at 38.
84. See id. at 37–38 (highlighting Operational Excellence and Corporate Stewardship).
85. Id. at 38.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 37–38.
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3. Alcoa, Inc.
Alcoa, Inc. (“Alcoa”) bases eighty-seven percent (87%) of the Chief
Executive Officer’s target pay based on performance, sixty-eight percent
(68%) of which is earned in the form of equity compensation.88 By relying
heavily on performance and directly correlating its equity compensation
with the corporation’s stock price, Alcoa believes that it aligns its
executive compensation practices with shareholder interests.
Specifically, Alcoa “reinforces pay for performance through annual and
long-term incentive targets focused on achieving strong financial and
operational performance in respect of goals over which Alcoa
managers have direct control.”89 In a shift from Intel and XCEL, Alcoa
specifically clarifies that the performance goals are strictly related to
matters in which the executives have control. Alcoa contends that since
this has been a standard practice for many years, its “management team is
highly focused on achieving productivity gains and other operational and
strategic improvements that benefit [the] top and bottom line
performance.”90 Alcoa also reports that twenty percent (20%) of all cash
incentive targets are based on an increase in energy efficiency and the
minimization of the corporation’s carbon footprint, which intimately
aligns with its “financial and societal commitments.”91
Despite economic and political uncertainty across its four businesses,
Alcoa managed to generate approximately $1.3 billion in productivity
gains and overhead costs reductions in fiscal year 2012. Alcoa has also
achieved an almost twenty-nine percent (29%) reduction in year-end debt
level since 2008 and, overall has significantly strengthened its liquidity
position. Despite a declining price of aluminum and an adverse impact on
total shareholder return, Alcoa’s common stock price remained stagnant—
increasing minimally from $8.65 per share on December 30, 2011 to $8.68
per share on December 31, 2012.92 Although the falling price of aluminum
has caused a decrease in total shareholder return and stock prices, Alcoa
remains steadfast in its corporate commitment to environmental sustainability

88. Alcoa Inc., 2013 Proxy Statement, at 35 (Mar. 14, 2013), available at http://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4281/000130817913000074/lalcoa2013_def14a.htm.
89. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 37.
92. Alcoa Inc., supra note 88, at 50.
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and its incorporation of such a commitment to its executive compensation
plan.
E. Difficulties Facing Sustainability Performance Measures
Similar to the difficulties of implementing performance -based
compensation, the introduction of sustainability performance measures
also face its fair share of criticism and critiques, the leading of which
relates to accurate measurement.
1. Accurate Measurement
As applicable to executive compensation, sustainability performance
measures face one big hurdle: accurate measurement. In executive
compensation, a performance-based measure needs to be easily measured and
clearly communicated to shareholders through regulatory disclosures.93 The
difficulty with some sustainability performance measures is that they are not
easily measureable in the short-term. For example, many ESG performance
measures are part of a long-term corporate strategy (e.g, decreasing energy
output over five years), and are thus unable to be measured for the annual
executive compensation bonuses. While some metrics are certainly
measureable, such as a decrease in GHG emissions or a decrease in energy
usage, others are more difficult to scale down in the short term. Although
minor instances of difficult measurement is not a major concern, we must
remember that corporations utilize performance- based compensation as an
avenue around Section 162(m),94 thus any sustainability performance
criteria must be readily measureable, which only further highlights the
importance of accurate measurement.
However, criticism of sustainability performance measures is certainly
not a reason to completely abandon the practice. Rather, compensation
committees, compensation consultants, and others must take this into
account when considering an addition to the proxy disclosures. In fact,
many of the measurement issues would be greatly diminished in importance
if the sustainability measures were omitted from the compensation plans.
Thus, prior to the introduction of sustainability measures, a corporation
must, among other things, consider if the measure is quantifiable, and, if
so, determine its feasibility in the context of recruiting and retaining top
executive talent while upholding the corporate commitments.

93. Failure to do so can result in litigation for “incomplete” or “misleading” disclosure
of pay practices. For more information, see The Hay Group, Executive Compensation
2013: Data Trends and Strategies, supra note 7, at 15.
94. See discussion supra Section II.B. and nn.19, 21.
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IV. GOING FORWARD
There has been a long-held disagreement among those in academia
about the role of the corporation:95 whether the corporation’s sole duty is
to maximize shareholder profits96 or whether the corporation’s primary,
but not exclusive, duty is to maximize shareholder profits.97 Before a
corporation can effectively evaluate whether sustainability performance
measures are appropriate, it must determine its approach to corporate
social responsibility.
A. Shareholder Primacy View
Friedman and Fischel argued that anyone who “declaim[s] that business is
not concerned ‘merely’ with profit but also with promoting desirable
‘social’ ends . . . [is] preaching pure and unadulterated socialism . . . and
[is] [an] unwitting puppet[] of the intellectual forces that have been
undermining the basis of a free society[.]”98 While this is a fairly strong
position, the threshold question is whether Friedman and Fischel have a
point here. Does the corporation have a duty to “promote desirable social
ends” by using a sustainability performance measure? Assuming arguendo,
that the corporation has no duty to promote social ends,99 are sustainability
performance measures inappropriate in all circumstances? This is likely
not the case in today’s efficient marketplace.

95. See Friedman, supra note 19; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (1982). But see Lynne L. Dallas,
Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 19, 30 (1988).
96. Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 459 (N.D. Ohio 1993)
(“[T]he sole duty of a corporation’s officers is to maximize shareholder wealth.”).
97. David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE
F OREST L. R EV. 523, 530–31 (2011) (“The constituency approach sees attention to
nonshareholder interests as a cost that comes at the expense of profit and therefore of
shareholder value. This is the trade-off or zero-sum assumption. In contrast, the sustainability
perspective sees attention to nonshareholders—including investment in their well-being—as
essential to the viability and success of the firm and therefore also to the enhancement of
shareholder value.”).
98. Friedman, supra note 19, at 33.
99. Although this is certainly a theory discussed in corporate law, it is almost certain
that shareholder primacy is not legally binding. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776
(Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (the court deferred to Wrigley’s business judgment and upheld his
decision regarding the installation of stadium lights).
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Hypothetically, by embracing Friedman’s view, the corporation’s sole
duty is to increase the profit of the shareholders. Friedman’s shareholder
primacy view, of course, allows the use of sustainability performance
measures in a scenario where it would benefit the corporation’s financial
bottom line. For example, a resource-intensive company may expend
significant waste and energy usage to provide a specific good, but the
corporation may be able to incentivize its executive officers by offering
an annual bonus to decrease the amount of energy usage while still
increasing production levels of that specific good. The corporation, of
course, would be seeking to align its interests in driving down production
costs (e.g., a decrease in energy expense or achieving certain production
efficiencies) with the shareholder’s interests (e.g., profit or total shareholder
return). In the current example, the shareholder would experience greater
profits because the costs of producing the good would decrease, while
production of the good would increase incrementally, thus spurring
increased profit upon sale. Should the corporation fail to achieve this
goal, the executive would not be rewarded for failure to perform under the
pre-established compensation goal.
It is apparent that manufacturing, energy, automobile, and other
resource-intensive corporations will likely have more opportunities than
other companies, such as investment banks, insurance providers, and
professional service firms, to make business decisions that promote
sustainability measures as well as benefit the corporation’s bottom line.100
Although it accounts for a small overall percentage, The Conference Board
found that manufacturing companies account for the highest percentage
of entities that embrace a combination of financial and extra-financial
metrics of performance. Consequently, the question becomes: “how do
non-resource intensive companies increase shareholder profits while
instituting a sustainability performance measure?” Certainly, and
unsurprisingly, the answer to this inquiry is: “it depends.”
1. Triple Bottom Line
Even if the corporation full-heartedly embraces Friedman’s shareholder
primacy view, it is entirely possible that such sustainability measures may
actually better the corporation’s bottom line. The “triple bottom line”
approach, as it is often called, views corporate performance in three
dimensions: (1) economic prosperity, (2) environmental quality, and (3)
social justice.101 Proponents of the “triple bottom line” approach argue
that a sustainable mindset will not only increase financial performance (often
100.
101.
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expressed in terms of profits, return on investment, shareholder value, and
total shareholder return), but also help the environment and society as a
whole.102 While embracing Friedman’s shareholder primacy principles, the
triple-bottom-line adherents note that “efforts to reduce waste and
pollution often result in greater efficiency and the discovery of innovative
techniques and materials, all of which in turn can benefit the
[corporation] . . . in the short and long runs.”103 Under the triple-bottom-line
approach, not only is it very possible to increase corporate profitability while
embracing sustainability principles, but it will also require a fact-specific,
individualized assessment. Failure to do so may result in a decrease in
shareholder profits, which would put the corporation at odds with the
shareholder primacy view and may subject the corporation to heightened
Say-on-Pay scrutiny.
Although it appears possible to embrace sustainability performance
measures under the shareholder primacy view, this Comment would never
purport to suggest a broad, one-size-fits-all solution to this problem.
However, there are characteristics that, through qualitative data gathering,
may help a corporation evaluate whether or not a sustainability performance
measure is feasible to incorporate in its executive compensation plan.
B. Sustainability Model of Corporate Social Responsibility104
In part, the Sustainability Model of Corporate Social Responsibility
(“Sustainability Model”) takes the position that the corporation has a duty
to enhance profits only so far as survival requires it, but does not extend
as far as to require profit maximization as required under the shareholder
primacy theory. Under the Sustainability Model, the case for a sustainability
performance measure is much more straightforward, but still contains
some technical difficulties.

102. Id.
103. Id. at 992; E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters
Can a Director Service? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS.
LAW. 761, 764–65 & n.9 (2008) (“[O]perating a business in an environmentally sustainable way
[may] make[ ] good business sense and therefore increase[ ] long-term financial value.”).
104. For ease of reference, this refers to the alternative method proposed by Professor
Millon. See Millon, supra note 98.
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As Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.105 set forth, a corporation is only organized
and carried on primarily for the profit of its shareholders.106 This
noteworthy opinion implies that shareholder profit is the primary purpose,
as opposed to the exclusive purpose, of the corporation. In support of this
interpretation, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) published its Principles of
Corporate Governance (the “Principles”). Section 2.01 of the Principles
states:
(a) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (b), a corporation should have as its
objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate
profit and shareholder gain; (b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are
not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of the business . . . (2)
[m]ay take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; and (3) [m]ay devote a
reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, education, and
philanthropic purposes.107

In light of the Principles, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., and other
constituency statutes,108 there is a strong case for the Sustainability
Model.109 Assuming the various authorities above were not present, it is
likely that corporate executives would still have the latitude to pursue
shareholder profit as the primary purpose, rather than the exclusive
purpose, under the Business Judgment Rule.110 Under the Sustainability
Model, there is little debate whether the corporation and the board of
directors would be insulated from any liability should they decide to
pursue environmental measures.
As the regulatory environment surrounding sustainability continues to
evolve, corporations must ask: “where do we want to go from here?” As
the industry sample demonstrates, each corporation takes a unique approach
to sustainability. The decision to invest in infrastructure to create
105. 204 Mich. 459 (1919).
106. Id. at 507 (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.”)
(emphasis added).
107. AM . LAW INST ., P RINCIPLES OF C ORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, Section 2.01 (1994).
108. For an example of a constituency statute, see ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY,
CORPORATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 99–100 (2010).
109. See generally Millon, supra note 98.
110. For a discussion of the Business Judgment Rule, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
The Business Judgment Rule As Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84 (2004);
Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the Business
Judgment Rule Protects A Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 635–39 (2007).
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manufacturing efficiencies, to make a concentrated effort to decrease energy
costs, or to sponsor a corporate-wide initiative on recycling, comes at no
small cost, especially to a corporation’s shareholders. Shareholders face an
unstable economy and an increasingly polarized government in Washington
D.C. that lends itself to uncertain regulations. Furthermore, shareholders
may frown upon unnecessary financial risks that put their total shareholder
returns in jeopardy. Despite these shareholder concerns, nearly seven
hundred U.S. corporations have publicly called for action on climate
change.111 If U.S. public companies feel a “social” responsibility to act on
climate change, the next logical question becomes “how should the
companies react?”
The answer to this question is: “it depends.” With nearly sixty percent
(60%) of corporations having already established renewable energy goals
and greenhouse gas reduction goals,112 it appears clear that companies feel
comfortable taking unilateral steps to affect climate change. However, the
issue this Comment presents is whether or not a corporation should take
the initiative to introduce the sustainability performance measures to its
executive compensation plan.
First and foremost, corporations need to reconcile the dichotomy
between shareholder primacy and the Sustainability Model and weigh
each accordingly before moving forward. With this at the forefront of
their decision-making, corporations can move forward to identify meaningful
ESG concerns and determine if it should focus on profit alone or balancing
profit and CSR.
If the answer is solely shareholder profit, then the question becomes
whether or not the companies within their peer group compensate
executives by this standard. This is important because if the peer group
companies do not use sustainability performance metrics, then the
corporation will be an outlier and may face a more difficult time in
recruiting and retaining top executives. With such a small existing sample,
this may be a unique situation for compensation consultants, but,
undoubtedly, should be a primary consideration. From that point, the
decision becomes an individual analysis based on current market share,
financial performance, and goodwill.
111. Mindy Lubber, Why Microsoft, eBay (And 650 Other Businesses) Are Calling
for U.S. Climate Action, FORBES (Sep. 27, 2013, 2:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mindy
lubber/2013/09/27/why-microsoft-ebay-and-650-other-businesses-are-calling-for-u-s-climateaction/.
112. Id.
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If it becomes a balancing act between profit and CSR, then the
corporation is likely better off by embracing corporation-wide sustainability
initiatives facilitated and monitored by a sustainability committee or a
Chief Sustainability Officer.113 The formation of a board committee on
sustainability alone indicates that the corporation has made corporate
sustainability a priority.114
From this point, corporations can gather quantitative data off of which
they can determine the feasibility of introducing such a performance
measure to its executive compensation plan. This analysis would consider
the relationship between the ESG measures and the financial performance of
the corporation. The ultimate conclusion of whether or not this would be
appropriate for an individual corporation would be solely based on the
feedback and data gathered by the committee or Chief Sustainability
Officer. This cautious and restrained approach prevents swift and drastic
corporate initiatives that have the potential to cause a decrease in total
shareholder return and loss in profits. Additionally, the more data that is
gathered over time, the more precise a corporate sustainability initiative
can be, should it be established in the future. This precision, effectively,
limits the amount of wasted resources that could be invested in a failed
performance measure and adds value to the corporation.
V. CONCLUSION
Each component of an executive compensation plan has a specific
purpose to comply with a very complex collection of state and federal
laws and regulations. Assuming a corporation clearly identifies and
establishes an objective, readily-measurable sustainability performance
measure it would almost certainly be protected by the Business Judgment
Rule to establish the desired environmental measures. This conclusion
too, however, presents an issue: whether or not sustainability performancebased compensation is the most efficient means to achieve corporate
sustainability goals. There is, of course, an easy answer to this question
as well: “it depends” on the conclusion of a fact-specific, individualized
assessment of a variety of factors particular to that corporation.

113. For an example of a corporate sustainability initiative not integrated into an
executive compensation plan, see Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability Report,
Fiscal Year 2014, BEST BUY, available at https://corporate.bestbuy.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/06/csr-2014-final.pdf.
114. Barnard, supra note 5, at 218 (“Creating a sustainability committee provides
(some) evidence that a company is committed to performance that goes beyond mere
compliance with existing and projected environmental laws. It can and does add flesh to
those (ubiquitous) corporate mission statements that identify sustainability as one of a
company’s key objectives.”).
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Although significant debate can exist regarding the role of a corporation in
the environmental movement, it remains clear that without changes in the
regulatory landscape, current trends indicate that we will likely see an
influx of different corporate sustainability initiatives in the near future.115
Exactly how these will look, whether they are incorporated in executive
compensation plans, appear solely on corporate websites, command a
presence on board-level sustainability committees, or otherwise, remains
to be seen.

115. Id. at 225 (noting that the mini-trend of board-level sustainability committees
“may be a leading indicator (a ‘green shoot’) of things to come.”).
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